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8.7 NUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics, DD/M&S

SUBJECT : Study on Utilities Support of Environmentally

Sensitive Equipment in the Headquarters

Building

REFERENCE: D/OL memo, same subject, dated 20 July 1973

1. On the face of it, the proposal stated in the reference seems perfectly sensible. However, so far as this Office is concerned, it spells disaster. This is because the implementation of the plan requires that FMSAC be moved out of the Headquarters Building for an extended period of time. Should this happen, I believe that the resulting degradation in the quality and timeliness of our intelligence production would become intolerable to the DDS&T and the DCI. My reasons for reaching this conclusion are spelled out in the rest of this memorandum.

- 2. We are one of the largest users of OJCS computer facilities. In terms of the OJCS accounting system, FMSAC used over \$80,000 worth of computer services during July 1973 and over a million dollars during Fiscal Year 1973. We do not anticipate a decline in this type of activity. When considering any modification to the computer facilities, therefore, it is essential that FMSAC's ready access to the large central computers be taken into account.
- 3. The reference memorandum presumes that special purpose computer equipment in use throughout the Agency can be operated effectively in an area remote from the user. This is not necessarily the case. Adding a remote capability to these systems could compromise their performance by reducing the core and time available for applications programs.

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- 4. Some offices depend upon dedicated special purpose equipment to perform certain tasks that are essential for the functioning of these offices. For example, we depend upon our CDC 1700 computer for processing teletype messages and various types of trajectory data, for making paper tape and card conversions, and for performing other associated functions. Many of these functions could not be performed from a remote location (i.e. outside the Headquarters Building).
- 5. We must have availability to the computer facilities in order to transfer data files in the form of printed listings, magnetic tapes, and cards in a fast, convenient way. Even if remote terminals were available we would be heavily dependent on courier service to transfer these data at a time when such services are being reduced because of personnel reductions.
- 6. A major reason for the retention of AND/OEL in the Headquarters Building when the rest of OEL moved to Building was the need for the telemetry processing center to be near the principal users. This arrangement provides the necessary interface between the analyst and the processor and the use of specialized AND/OEL equipment, such as the interactive graphics system now tied into the AND/OEL processing subsystem. Physical separation of the telemetry analysts from the processors would make the situation almost unworkable. Requirements for proximity to the OEL processing center will become more acute now that it has been decided to merge DSD/OSI and FMSAC into the new Office of Weapons Intelligence. Telemetry analysis functions will undoubtedly expand as a result of this merger.
- 7. Additionally, the telemetry analysts in FMSAC have made plans, and implemented certain procedures, that require an interface with OJCS in the digital data area. We are extensively involved in maintaining the Agency's telemetry externals data base on various computerized files. Thus, it would be a great inconvenience to be physically separated from OJCS for any extended period of time.

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- 8. A possible move outside the Headquarters Building would have the following immediate effects to our production of current intelligence: publication and coordination of timely analysis in the daily Missile and Space Summary would be cumbersome and subject to delay; the Operations Center would no longer be a ready source of reference information for our analysts; and Operations Center analysts would be isolated from the mainstream of FMSAC thinking -- their output would be degraded and the Center would no longer be an effective training ground.
- 9. Your attention is called to the fact that a special study was recently completed of the desirability of integrating the strategic intelligence research being performed by OSR with the weapons intelligence analysis being performed in FMSAC and OSI. Serious consideration was given to moving the total effort into one Directorate, either DDI or DDS&T. The CIA Management Committee decided not to do this, in large part because coordination of effort across Directorate lines had been demonstrated to be working reasonably well. But if FMSAC were moved out of the Headquarters Building it would be impossible to sustain the close working relationships between ourselves and OSR which have proved to be so necessary.
- 10. Finally, and perhaps most important, FMSAC and the Defensive Systems Division of OSI are being merged into one Office. The whole purpose of this is to achieve a more effective production of weapons intelligence within DDS&T. The new office will have 1/3 of its strength located on the 4th floor of the Headquarters Building. It is going to be a difficult enough job to integrate the FMSAC and DSD components into an effective whole. It will be impossible to do this if 2/3 of the people in the office are shipped out of the building.

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11. I believe that these considerations argue strongly that FMSAC remain in the Headquarters Building. We feel that the ideal solution to the problem would be the construction of a dedicated ESE facility on the grounds of the Headquarters complex. Despite the difficulties involved this would, in the long run, be more economical and efficient.

DAVID S. BRANDWEIN
Director
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

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